UNSC Briefing on DPRK Maritime Sanctions

Remarks delivered on 30 April 2026

On 30 April 2026, the Open Source Centre delivered the following remarks to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in New York.

Mr. President, distinguished members of the Security Council, I appreciate the opportunity to brief you today.

My name is James Byrne. I am the founder and CEO of the London-based Open Source Centre and a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute. For several years, my team has generated open-source evidence of North Korea’s illicit trade. Some of this work focuses on the procurement of refined petroleum and the export of coal and iron ore, conducted in contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions.

Last year, the OSC presented evidence to the Council of six vessels loading prohibited cargo within North Korean territory, establishing a clear pattern of activity in violation of these Resolutions.

These Resolutions, including 2371 and 2397, specifically prohibit any type of transfer and export of North Korean coal and iron ore. They also state that the revenues generated from the exports of coal and other commodities directly contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs.

What we will show today is clear evidence that this pattern persists – evidence supported by a methodology that integrates high-resolution satellite imagery, AIS transponder records, and vessel specification databases. This approach allows for the definitive identification of vessels loading coal and other commodities in contravention of UN resolutions.

Vessel

IMO

Dates observed in DPRK

DREAM WAVE

8693073

28 November 2025

PEACEFUL 8

1039424

4 January 2026

19 March 2026

OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA

9178070

13 February 2026

13 March 2026

13 April 2026

FU RUN DA 1

1099814

7-25 February 2026

ORION

9638953

19 April 2026

From November 2025 to April 2026, the Open Source Centre has observed at least five additional vessels conducting eight journeys into North Korea to load cargo such as coal and iron ore. As can be seen in this overview slide, these are the ORION, PEACEFUL 8, OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA, DREAM WAVE and FU RUN DA 1.

Three of these vessels were recently de-flagged by their respective flag states. Two, the ORION and the OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA, continue to sail under a Russian flag. One, the DREAM WAVE, was recently reflagged to Tanzania.

The evidentiary standard for inclusion today is high – we have not included a number of additional vessels we believe have likely visited to load coal or other commodities.

The ORION

The first case and the most recent of these vessels is a 130-metre long cargo ship named the ORION loading coal at the North Korean port of Songnim in mid-April 2026.

The ORION started its journey in Sakhalin, Russia on 6 April. From here, it sailed around the Korean Peninsula and through the Yellow Sea. AIS data from the ship’s transponder show the vessel was transmitting inside North Korean territorial waters and the port of Songnim on 16, 18 and 20 April 2026.

Source: Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Windward Maritime AI, Open Source Centre.

Source: Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Windward Maritime AI, Open Source Centre.

Over this period, we collected imagery of different kinds from three different commercial providers: Satellogic, Umbra and Vantor using different kinds of satellite sensors. These sensors independently show the same thing: the ORION in North Korea loading coal.

Source: Umbra Space, Open Source Centre.

Source: Umbra Space, Open Source Centre.

These images are available for anyone that cares to subscribe to these services, and clearly show the vessel at the location where the ship’s transponder was openly transmitting on 18 April at 8:36 UTC.

Source: Satellogic, Open Source Centre.

Source: Satellogic, Open Source Centre.

These images also clearly show large piles of coal at the loading berths next to the ORION.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

In particular, an image on 19 April clearly shows coal being loaded into the hold of the vessel, which has its cargo hatches open. The images also show the coal pile decreasing in size, in addition to trucks and excavators moving the coal towards the feeder belts that are being used to load the ORION.

The ORION is the latest instance of a foreign-flagged vessel sailing into North Korea to load sanctioned commodities.

However, since November 2025, the Open Source Centre has identified an additional four vessels also loading commodities such as coal and iron ore in North Korea.

In our last presentation for the UN Security Council in May 2025, we detailed some of the deceptive practices foreign-flagged vessels undertook to disguise their activities. These have continued, but in recent months we have seen more complex and coordinated schemes designed for the same purpose.

The PEACEFUL 8

In one such instance, a 130-metre long vessel named the PEACEFUL 8 – also known as RUN DA 8 – spoofed an extended trip to the Russian Far East in order to disguise its activities in Wonsan, North Korea on 17, 19 and 20 March 2026.

Source: Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Windward Maritime AI, Open Source Centre.

Source: Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Windward Maritime AI, Open Source Centre.

Although the vessel was transmitting its position as sailing towards Russian waters, satellite imagery shows there was no vessel at these locations.

Source: Planet Labs, Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Windward Maritime AI, Open Source Centre.

Source: Planet Labs, Starboard Maritime Intelligence, Windward Maritime AI, Open Source Centre.

If you look at these images, taken by Planet Labs, what do you see: open ocean. Instead, high-resolution images taken on the same dates show that the vessel was in Wonsan loading coal.

Source: Satellogic, Open Source Centre.

Source: Satellogic, Open Source Centre.

As in the case of the ORION, in these images, we can see the vessel’s cargo hatches are open and coal is being loaded into the hold. But there were other vessels as well.

The OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA

In February, March and April 2026, a 97-metre long cargo vessel named the OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA was observed across three separate trips to the coal terminal at the North Korean port of Chongjin.

Source: Planet Labs, Open Source Centre.

Source: Planet Labs, Open Source Centre.

On the first trip, on 13 and 15 February, the vessel was observed with its cargo bays open at the coal terminal. On 15 February, coal piles were observed next to the vessel with its cargo hold open, with cranes on the pier in use.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

On the second, on 12 and 13 March, the vessel was observed back in Chongjin again with its cargo hold open next to piles of commodities on the pier.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

On the third trip, the vessel was observed again on 10 April 2026 back in Chongjin, once again berthed with its cargo hold open.

Source: Planet Labs, Open Source Centre.

Source: Planet Labs, Open Source Centre.

The DREAM WAVE

In November 2025, a 99-metre long vessel named the DREAM WAVE was anchored outside the port of Tanchon, North Korea. Subsequent imagery shows the vessel sailing into port, towards coal stored on the pier.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

Source: Planet Labs, Vantor, Open Source Centre.

Source: Planet Labs, Vantor, Open Source Centre.

The FU RUN DA 1

On the other side of the country, in February 2026, the FU RUN DA 1 was observed leaving the North Korean port of Nampo after berthing at the coal terminal.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

Source: Vantor, Open Source Centre.

In these two images, you can clearly see the FU RUN DA 1 leaving with coal in its hold.

Source: Satellogic, Open Source Centre.

Source: Satellogic, Open Source Centre.

Conclusion

Taken together, this evidence confirms that at least five large cargo vessels – the ORION, PEACEFUL 8, OSTROV ANTSIFEROVA, DREAM WAVE, and FU RUN DA 1 – have continued to load sanctioned commodities in North Korean ports for delivery abroad. This is not a series of isolated incidents but an ongoing pattern of UN sanctions violations.

Several of these vessels have visited repeatedly - and these presented here today are not an exhaustive list. This evidence will later be made available on the Open Source Centre’s website.

Our methodology integrates high-resolution satellite imagery, transponder logs, vessel databases and a range of other sources, consistent with the rigorous standards established by the UN Panel of Experts. These findings represent a factual record of ongoing violations that directly fund North Korea’s prohibited weapons programme. We submit this record to the Council and remain at your disposal for further inquiry.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your time.

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