Brothers in Arms

Importance of Artillery

During the early months of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s daily expenditure of artillery rounds reportedly reached a high point of 38,000 rounds per day. Some estimates, such as those made by the Estonian Government, put this number even higher at 60,000 during the spring of 2022. Following this peak, however, the daily rate of fire stabilised, ranging between 7,000 and 16,000 rounds, but averaging around 10,000 rounds per day. 

Even with large increases in domestic production capabilities during 2023, Russia struggled to sustain the volumes of fire required of a prolonged high-intensity conflict due to a lack of available ammunition and the vulnerabilities created by Ukraine’s long-range precision strikes on critical logistical nodes and storage facilities. 

The first reports of Russian forces using North Korean munitions at scale began to appear on social media in November 2023, three months after deliveries started from the North Korean port of Rajin. The posts on Telegram and X contained images of North Korean manufactured 122 mm, 152 mm, and 122 mm rockets - in addition to a number of other munitions. 

Meanwhile, evidence confirming the battlefield use of North Korean munitions by Russian forces has emerged from multiple sources, including compromised Telegram channels frequently used by Russian personnel. Intercepted messages, seen by the OSC, reveal Russian soldiers discussing the receipt of ‘Korean product’ 152 mm calibre on the frontline. 

More recent reports suggest that North Korea is further seeking to increase its production capacity for weapons and munitions, with directives reportedly being issued to major munitions factories to operate at full capacity for 24 hours a day. As such, it is possible that North Korea has begun manufacturing and shipping newly-manufactured howitzer shells, rockets and other weapons to Russia since the deliveries began. 

North Korean Deliveries

To estimate the volume of munitions that North Korea has transferred to Russia, OSC collected over 180 satellite images, identifying at least 64 trips undertaken by the Angara, Maria, Lady R and Maia-1. Notably, all of these vessels conducted these journeys without transmitting on their AIS transponders, meaning that each vessel had to be identified in each image. In order to estimate the numbers of possible North Korean munitions shipped in these containers, the OSC used images from previously interdicted North Korean munitions shipments and other open sources of DPRK-origin munitions such as 122 mm and 152 mm artillery shells. 

These crates and munitions were measured and modelled in three dimensions, and then stacked into modelled containers. This allowed us to estimate, with a high degree of accuracy, the volumes of different munitions that the Angara, Lady R, Maria and Maia-1 could have moved in each container over these 64 journeys.

To help estimate the total volume of munitions in these containers, OSC used an official Ukrainian percentage breakdown of North Korean munitions deliveries reviewed by Reuters. These assessments stated the split between North Korean munitions types was likely 60% 122 mm howitzer rounds, 25% 152 mm howitzer rounds and 15% 122 mm rockets.

Together, this analysis reveals that over 15,000 containers have been shipped from North Korea to Russia, potentially containing over 6 million combined 122 mm and 152 mm artillery shells and 122 mm rockets.

As noted above, the cadence of deliveries likely account for approximately 750 containers a month. Taking into account these numbers, North Korea could be providing approximately 200,000 munitions per month, if all 122 mm howitzer rounds were delivered in a single-crate configuration. However, if deliveries included an equal split with 122 mm double-crated howitzer rounds, this would account for deliveries of 279,000 munitions per month. 

Onward Shipments

Once munitions have arrived in Russia’s Far East, they must be transported by rail to ammunition depots close to the Ukrainian border and then distributed onwards towards the frontlines.

Ukrainian assessments seen by Reuters, and high-resolution satellite imagery collected and analysed by the OSC, indicate that these rail deliveries began arriving at a variety of Russia’s munition depots shortly after shipments from Rajin started.

Satellite imagery of depots at Tikhoretsk, Mozdok, Toropets, Kirzhach and Karachev all show twenty-foot containers arriving at the facilities in late 2023 and throughout 2024. Exclusive documents provided by Reuters detail North Korean munitions being delivered to specific units in Mozdok and Toropets in April and May 2024, with satellite imagery showing blue containers arriving in the same month, and then throughout the year.

In September 2024, several of these facilities were attacked by Ukrainian drone strikes. The importance of these munition deliveries made them a high value target, and significant parts of the facilities at Toropets and Tikhoretsk were destroyed. Reports indicated these strikes may have cut Russia's artillery rates by up to half, once again underlining the strategic value of ammunition arriving at these depots.

Conclusion

The scope and scale of North Korea’s munitions supply to Russia presents a significant challenge to Ukraine and its Western partners.

The provision of not only ammunition, but of ballistic missiles and even troops by North Korea directly counteracts Western efforts to adequately support Ukraine in its attempts to repel Russian forces. As this supply continues unabated, this has significant implications not only for wider Europe but also East Asian security.